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Dreaming and Reality: A Neuroanthropological Account
Charles D. Laughlin

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
In what sense is dreaming real to people of different cultures? How do they come to
conclude that dreaming is real, and how do they use dreams to expand their knowledge
and control of real events? The reader is introduced to dream anthropology and shown that
there are universal patterns to how dreams are experienced, expressed, and used by societies.
The distinction between monophasic and polyphasic cultures is described, the latter being
the majority of societies that consider dreaming as being in some sense real. Neuroscience
supports the notion that there is a natural realism behind the experience of reality in any
and all alternative states of consciousness (ASC), and that whatever the ASC, there is a
transcendental set of obduracies and affordances that condition the modeling, expression,
and social interpretation of experiences, most especially those encountered in archetypal (or
special) dreams.
Keywords: dreaming, reality, ethnoepistemology, brain, neuroanthropology, culture
The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping,
because our attention then lapses from the sensible world.
Conversely when we wake, the attention usually lapses from
the dream-world and that becomes unreal. But if a dream
haunts us and compels our attention during the day, it is
very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort
of sub-universe alongside of the waking world. Most people
have probably had dreams which it is hard to imagine not to
have been glimpses into an actually existing region of being...
—William James, The Principles of Psychology
(1890/2007, p. 294)

A

ll human beings on the planet sleep, and while
asleep they dream. The people in most of the
4,000-plus cultures on the planet pay close
attention to their dreams and consider them to be
in some sense real. In what sense is dreaming real to
peoples? How do they come to conclude that dreaming
is real, and how do they use dreams to expand their
knowledge about, and their control over, real events?
In this article I will explore the reality of dreaming and
present a neuroanthropological account explaining why
most peoples treat dreaming as veridical.1 I will begin
by making a crucial distinction between two types of
culture, one of which predominates among the world’s
traditional cultures. Also, it will be necessary to explore
the phenomenological elements that contribute to
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experiencing dreaming as real before offering examples
of such dream cultures and how they make use of
the information obtained in dreams. I will conclude
by suggesting a neuroanthropological explanation of
why most peoples in the world consider dreaming as a
domain of reality.
Monophasic and Polyphasic Cultures
imply put, there are two types of cultures on the
planet—monophasic and polyphasic (Laughlin,
2011, pp. 62-66; Laughlin, McManus & d’Aquili, 1990,
p. 293). In modern materialistic, technocratic societies,
children are typically taught to disattend to their dreams
and to focus on waking interactions with the external
physical and social world (see Mageo, 2003b; Wax,
2004). Children are taught from infancy that dreams are
not real—that they are a fiction (“just a dream”)—and
that they just happen for no apparent reason and can
be ignored. Elementary schools typically do not address
one’s dream life (see King, Welt, & Bulkeley, 2011), and
information obtained in dreams, if any, bears little or
no relevance to the waking world. Dreams, therefore,
tend not to inform culture all that much, especially with
respect to people’s spiritual life.2 These societies manifest
what is called monophasic cultures (Laughlin, McManus,
& d’Aquili, 1990, p. 293; Laughlin & Throop, 2001;
McManus, Laughlin, & Shearer, 1993; LaHood, 2007;
Lumpkin, 2001; Saniotis, 2010; Rodd, 2006) which tend
to skew the development of consciousness away from
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alternative states of consciousness (ASC) like dreaming,
trance, drug trips, meditative states, visions, and other
ritually-driven spiritual states, and toward what is
thought of as “normal” waking perceptual and cognitive
processes oriented outward to the external world.
A monophasic orientation towards dreaming
leaves its mark on sleep and dream research, as well as
on the accounts of Western anthropologists for whom
dreams usually have to be demythologized in some way
in order for them to be meaningful—that is, the dream
must make sense to rational thought in the waking
state to make any sense at all (Tedlock, 1992b, p. 4;
Bourguignon, 2003, p. 137). This Western bias in part
explains: (1) why Freudian dream analysis has been
so attractive to so many 20th century ethnographers,
because one need not pay serious attention to the
manifest content of dreams, or to the pragmatic,
utilitarian repercussion of dreams, and (2) why a Jungian
approach has generally been eschewed, for it requires
some phenomenological sophistication on the part of
the fieldworker to understand Jungian methods (see
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012).
Dreaming among people raised in the world’s
modern industrial societies stands in sharp contrast to
that of people living in most human societies on the
planet—indeed, it stands in contrast to both Western
society’s pre-industrial cultural history and that of other
modern, industrial societies such as Japan, China, and
Brazil, during which dreaming and dream interpretation
were highly valued.3 Aside from these modern industrial
societies, roughly 90% of traditional societies seek out
and value experiences had in ASCs, and especially in
dreams (Bourguignon, 1973; Bourguignon & Evascu,
1977). These traditional societies are called polyphasic
cultures, meaning that they value experiences had in the
dream-life and in other ASCs (see Locke & Kelly, 1985).
There appears to be a kind of watershed between the
two extremes, in which disattention to ASCs altogether
will produce an extremely monophasic standpoint from
which identity and culture are associated, most likely
caused by the enculturation prescribed by an extremely
materialistic political economy.
There are, of course, individuals—indeed
there are even groups and professions—within Western
society that are “into their dreams” to some extent,
though usually in relation to one kind of psychotherapy
or another (see, e.g., Edgar 1995). But polyphasic
cultures are quite different from the ones to which
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most Westerners belong. These are societies in which
dream experiences are conceived by people as different
domains of reality, not as unreality. Indeed, most people
on the planet, even those in monophasic cultures, rarely
if ever make a distinction between experienced reality
and extramental reality in their everyday lives. Their
sense of identity incorporates memories of experiences
had in dreams and other ASCs, as well as those had in
waking life. People may in fact have no word in their
native tongue that glosses “dream” in our English sense
(Basso, 1992; Merrill, 1992, p. 199). What Westerners
call a “dream” may be considered by others to be the
polyphasic ego (soul, spirit, shadow, etc.) of a person
experiencing another domain of reality during sleep.4
Dream experiences, just as waking experiences, inform
the society’s general system of knowledge about the self
and the world, as well as the development of a person’s
identity (see Ridington, Robin, & Ridington, 1970).
One can thus understand why ethnographer JeanGuy Goulet’s (1998) hosts among the Guajiro (a South
American people) would not allow him to live with them
unless he “knew how to dream” (p. 22). One may also
understand why the anthropology of dreaming has for
generations focused upon polyphasic cultures, perhaps
because they are so at-odds with Western everyday,
materialist expectations, and because the experiences
they relate to from their alternative states appears so
exotic to the Western perspective.
Phenomenology of Dreaming
efore examining the nature and experience of
reality, and constructing an explanation of why
peoples across the planet consider dreaming real, it is
helpful to ground this discussion in the phenomenology
of dream reality—that is, what is it about the experience
of dreaming that people in so many societies find actual,
compelling, informative, and useful. This can begin
by delimiting aspects of dreaming that are universal to
people everywhere.
Indiscernibility
If one brackets (i.e., sets aside one’s belief in) the
reality of waking life and the unreality of dream life, the
two life-worlds are “indiscernible” (Globus, 1987; see also
Kirtsoglou, 2010, p. 323). Both dreaming and waking
worlds are grounded in pure experience and solely on
that basis one cannot tell them apart—they are equally
domains of lived experience (i.e., they are life-worlds),
and must be studied as such.5 This phenomenological
finding makes a lot of sense neurophysiologically, for
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both dream and waking experience are mediated by
the same sensorium—that is, most of the brain systems
that mediate waking experiences also mediate dream
experiences (Pagel, 2008, p. 63).6 This finding also makes
ethnographic sense because so many of the peoples
ethnographers have lived amongst and studied consider
dreaming to be just as real as waking.7
Is it possible to tell dreaming and waking apart
on other grounds? Yes:
The answer here is that the differences [one’s]
reflection notes are not fundamental but related to
sensory functions, which are highly restricted in
sleep and open during waking. The dream life is like
the wake life, except that there is no flowing array of
sensory stimulation available to modulate it. As lived,
the dream life is an authentic life, but reflection
reveals that it is a peculiar unmodulated life because
of the sensory restriction. (Globus, 1987, p. 65).
While dreaming, people actually perceive “people,”
“plants,” “animals,” and “clouds” as being real. They
are right there before the mind’s eye. In the dream one
reacts and interacts with these images because they are
real in that life-world (Craig, 1987). What else can be
discerned about dreams relative to waking experiences?
Globus (1987) suggested that there is a distinct “singlemindedness” about dreams. Dreams tend to proceed
along a single train of thought, as opposed to waking life
where there are many more distractions and alternative
possibilities.
Apodicticity
Ethnologists often speak of a people’s “beliefs”
with respect to the culture’s local knowledge. Under
certain circumstances, this way of referring to local
knowledge makes sense, for it allows the fieldworker
to dodge any question of the truth-value of the hosts’
ethnoepistemology—that is, a people’s own theory of
how they come to know what they claim to know (see
Hongladarom, 2002). Yet this approach to local knowledge also distorts the phenomenology of knowing, for
the way Western English-speakers use the word “belief”
tends to imply a hedge on certainty of knowledge—as
in, “well, I believe so,” or “that was what she believed
anyway.” One thing that is lost in using the term “belief”
to label local knowledge is the sense of apodicticity 8 that
may accompany an act of knowing among the people
who are studied. For most peoples, there is no suggestion
that dreaming is fantasy or fiction. “Rather, they take
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them to be literal experiences of the dreamer’s soul—as
[Edward B.] Tylor first proposed—the gripping reality
of a dream while it is being experienced is certainly
a powerful reinforcement of the idea in the waking
afterthought” (Tuzin, 1975, p. 563).
Goulet (1987) took up the distinction between
belief and knowledge with regard to Dene Tha ways of
knowing:
Among the Dene Tha, as among other Northern
Athapaskans, knowledge that has been mediated is
regarded with doubt. True knowledge is considered
to be that which is derived from experience. . . .
This view has profound implications for what Dene
consider the proper way to teach or inform not only
their children and each other, but also the inquisitive
ethnographer approaching them to learn about their
ways and their religion. (pp. 115-116)
In other words, the Dene Tha value knowledge from
direct experience, regardless of the state of consciousness
during which the knowledge is derived. Only through
direct experience can one achieve that sense of the
apodicticity of knowledge. In Dene terms, if I know
something, I know it because I experienced it, and an
ingredient of the experience is the immediate sense of
apodicticity—the certainty that “this is the case,” or
“this is not the case.” This is less a logical and more an
existential certainty.
The Dene Tha are quite forthright about the
dependence of true knowledge upon experience—
namely, they choose not to share knowledge with anyone
unprepared to understand it.
Dene tend to exclude those who are not perceived
as knowing from those among whom they discuss
experiences of dreams, visions, and power. Such
discussion occurs only between those who are “in
the know.” To one who “knows” and understands,
Dene offer a degree of explanation according to
their estimation of his or her understanding. This
estimation of the ethnographer’s “knowledge,”
more than the investigator’s own research agenda,
determines the flow of information between the
two, information that most often takes the form
of stories, the significance of which at first simply
escapes the ethnographer. (Goulet, 1987, p. 114)
As Goulet (1994) put it, “true knowledge is personal
knowledge” (p. 114) and the only access to knowledge
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gleaned from dreaming is by way of learning the skills
of the dreamer.
Revealing the Hidden
When one brackets the belief in the unreality
of dreams, one is better able to appreciate one very
significant and universal pattern in the phenomenology
of dreaming cross-culturally—that in dreams, entities
and forces that are normally invisible to waking life may
become sensible, tangible, and even palpable during
dreaming (see Sumegi, 2008, p. 31). For example,
Meggitt (1962) noted that among the Mae Enga of
New Guinea, ghosts are invisible while one is awake,
but visible in dreams. There are innumerable examples
of societies in which dead ancestors, mere shades or
shadows during the waking state, become significant
characters and causal agents in dreams. Irving Hallowell
(1960/2002), in reflecting upon the world view of the
Ojibwa Indians, spoke of “other-than-human persons”
encountered within dreams. He noted, “While in all
cultures ‘persons’ comprise one of the major classes of
objects to which the self must become oriented, this
category of being is by no means limited to human
beings. In Western culture, as in others, ‘supernatural’
beings are recognized as ‘persons,’ although belonging,
at the same time, to the other than human category” (p.
20).
Ethnographers often find that in their hosts’
world, they do not merely “believe” in other-than-human
persons, but actually know them. They know them
because they encounter them and interact with them in
their dream life. This factor is of primary importance to
cross-cultural dream research. It is what Goulet (1998) is
getting at when he wrote:
I agree with [Clifford] Geertz that we can neither live
other people’s lives nor magically intrude on their
consciousness, whether members of our own culture
or of another. But to see the task of the ethnographer
as Geertz defines it precludes some of what we can
do and learn in the field, not only about others but
also about ourselves in our interaction with them.
Ethnographic work can—but does not need to—go
hand in hand with the anthropologist’s experience
of dreams and visions. These often become part
of interactions with others. . . . More than merely
listen to what others say about their lives, then,
anthropologists pay attention to their own lives,
including their inner lives. They observe and listen
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to other people’s responses to their accounts of
their own dreams and/or visions experienced while
living among these others. To do so is to become an
experiential ethnographer. (p. 254)
Predicting the Future
Dreams are a ubiquitous source of information,
not only about the self, but about future events (Goulet,
1998, pp. xxvii-xxix). People everywhere want to know
what is going to happen before it does happen—thus
removing a major source of uncertainty, anxiety, and
stress.9 Some wake up in the morning and tune in to
the weather report so that they do not go out into foul
weather unprepared. Yet everyone knows how inaccurate
weather reports can be. So too may the precognition
of events in a dream be questionable. Many peoples
evaluate the accuracy of divinatory dreams by waiting
to see if the predicted results actually happen—in other
words, they use post hoc reasoning (Krippner, 1994).10
The Lacandon Maya take a “wait-and-see”
attitude toward such dreams. Robert Bruce (1975)
demonstrated this attitude by recording dreams and
then seeing how the people interpret the prediction
relative to what happens later on—whether or not the
dream is confirmed as “predictive.” For instance:
Dream: Mateo (Sr.) of Najá dreamed of two domestic
pigs, and later of kitam (collared peccary).
Interpretation: Foreigners are coming, and there will
be two of them. . . .
Confirmation: Not confirmed . . . unless (as is
often the case) it was remembered long enough to
be rationalized upon arrival of the next foreigners,
weeks later. (p. 45)
Or again:
Dream: [On June 7] Antonio (first son-in-law of
Chan K’in of Najá) dreamed of Augusto de la Cruz,
of a Tzeltal family living in El Carmen, coming to
sell bread.
Interpretation: The person in question is thought to
be of the deer Onen, so may foretell seeing a deer.
Confirmation: June 9, K’in Bol (son-in-law in service
to Chan K’in of Najá) killed a deer. (p. 49)
Goulet (1998; pp. 155-159) noted that the Dene
Tha consider precognition in dreams as commonplace—
what they call “knowing with the mind.” “Dreaming
in this manner, one knows where to go to kill a moose,
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discerns if a medicine fight has ended with the destruction
of the power of the enemy, or learns that deceased
relatives are well and happy in the other land” (p. 156).
Goulet (1998) related an interesting story about a Dene
Tha woman who quite suddenly suffered insomnia for
two nights; she told her sister about it and her sister sent
her to a local healer.
The healer responded with the narration of a dream
he had had two nights before. The dream was for a
woman who was to visit him for help. In the dream
the healer set his snares for beavers. Beavers came up
to the snares but did not get caught. In his dream he
had seen lots of clothes just scattered around; some
were burnt, and others were still smoking. There
was also a wolf around the area. When he woke up
he wondered why he had had that dream. He told
the sick woman that most people in the community
looked after their things well. (p. 160)
The patient then confessed that when her son had
refurbished the attic of their house, he had thrown some
of her old clothes downstairs. She was told to take care of
them, but she didn’t. Instead, some kids gathered them
up and took them outside and burned them in the yard.
The healer then told the patient that she had become ill
because she should have done the proper thing, and not
just what she felt like doing. In Dene Tha psychology,
there is a close symbolic association between clothing
and the self (Goulet, 1998, p. 99).
The very idea that dreams may actually foretell
future events flies in the face of modern Western
mechanistic and technocratic conditioning about
causation. The notion that one can “see into the future”
violates the commonsense model in which event A
causes event B, where A happens before B, and not
vice-versa. Yet, well-controlled scientific experiments
have demonstrated both precognition (or “future
sight”),11 and causation at a distance and backwards
causation.12 For instance, psychologist David Ryback
(1988) investigated precognitive dreaming in college
students. He administered a questionnaire to over 433
subjects and found that 290 (66.9%) reported some kind
of paranormal dream. Although he ended up dropping
many of these claims as unfounded, he did conclude that
8.8% of the population did in fact have precognitive
dreams (see also Rhine, 1969).
In a series of ingenious experiments, Dean
Radin (1997b; see also 2006, Ch. 10) and D. J. Bierman
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(Bierman & Radin, 1997, 1999) have demonstrated
a robust precognition or “presentiment” effect using
physiological indicators of “precognitive information”
when subjects act before they are presented with a
random stimulus. Here’s how the experiments work. The
subject sits alone in a room in a comfortable chair and
is “wired-up” to machines that measure the activity of
their autonomic system, and hence their emotional state.
When the subject is ready, they push a button and around
seven seconds later a random image is shown on a screen.
The image may be of a calming nature, or may be highly
emotional (violent or erotic). A computer decides which
picture to show after the subject pushes the button. Each
subject does this a set number of times. Results showed
that subjects tend to respond emotionally several seconds
before the picture appears, and the correlation between
measures of emotional reaction and highly emotional
imagery is significant. Bierman and Scholte (2002) took
this research even further by carrying it out on subjects
while their brains were being scanned using a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine. Again,
they showed that areas mediating appropriate emotion
(calm or intense feeling) became active before the
randomized image was shown.
This kind of research is by its very nature
controversial among Western academics. Arguments
rage over whether or not a “presentiment effect” exists
or not. It would be interesting to know with absolute
certainty that precognitive dreams actually happen or
not in experimental situations. But in the sense in which
precognitive or “presentiment” dreams in anthropology
are spoken of, it is less important whether they actually
foretell events, and more important that informants and
the societies being researched experience presentiments
as real and act upon them—an ethnographic reminder
of the old W. I. Thomas theorem: “It is not important
whether or not the interpretation is correct—if
men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572). As
demonstrated here, most polyphasic societies do believe
in and experience precognitive dreaming, however
empirical or skeptical they may be of any particular
incidence of it.
Ethnographic information is commonly
anecdotal descriptions and self-reports. Take for instance
ethnographer Edith Turner’s (1996) precognitive dream
experiences while doing fieldwork among the Iñupiat
people of northern Alaska. On October 5th she recorded
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a “waking” dream she had in which she “saw a man who
was having to carry a whole pile of stuff like window
glass—it had something to do with my house” (p. 38).
On November 26th, she had an intruder who broke into
her basement by breaking a window (p. 80), and then
on December 7th the trash man arrived. “I showed him
the sheets of broken glass in the furnace room. He lifted
them carefully and carried them out of the house to the
truck. Immediately my waking dream of October 5
came back to me—a distinct picture of a man carrying a
whole pile of stuff like window glass” (p. 83). For Turner,
this break-in and glass removal were a “disturbance” that
was presaged in dream.
Special Dreams
Most peoples distinguish between normal
everyday dreaming, and the occasional special dream
that has much greater significance. J. S. Lincoln (1935) in
his classic book, The Dream in Primitive Culture, called
the latter type a culture pattern dream (p. 22), similar to
what others have referred to as special, “big,” archetypal,
titanic, significant, or memorable dreams. “These dreams
may be rare in the dream lives of most people, yet they
surely occur to many as memorable exceptions. Some,
like [C. G.] Jung and tribal shamans, seem to dream in
an archetypal style characteristically. The major defining
feature of these dreams, part and parcel of their uncannynuminous quality and aesthetically rich structure, is the
powerful sense of felt meaning and portent conveyed
directly within the dream” (p. 129).
Benjamine Kilborne (1992) has suggested
that the degree of elaboration of dream classification
in a society may be proportional to the importance
of dreaming in that society. Although there are no
holocultural data as yet to support this assertion, it does
make some sense, for that is the strong impression one has
from the ethnographic literature on polyphasic peoples.
In any event, Kilborne shows that modern Moroccans
hold the distinction between true dreams that are
divinely inspired, and false or deceitful dreams derived
from other sources (p. 185). Dream categories vary
with the informant, but may seem to consider dreams
divisible into: (1) message dreams—divinatory dreams
dreamt in holy places; (2) warning dreams—messages
received from ancestors, and others, offering advice
and cautions about the future, essentially divinatory
dreams; (3) preoccupation dreams—dreams driven by
internal positive or negative emotions; and (4) normal
(“day residue”) dreams—problem solving dreams, and
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so on. Only the first category is considered true beyond
question, for they derive from Allah and true dreams are
associated with safety and harmony, while false dreams
may derive from the djinn spirits who may be good or
bad, and may be harmful and destructive.
Neural Models and Dreaming
sychological anthropologists have focused most of
their attention upon the psychiatric, psychodynamic,
spiritual, social-sharing, and self-oriented issues of
dreaming. However, because ethnologists tend to be
humanists and not natural scientists, their training in
the neurosciences is usually minimal, at best. As a result,
modern ethnological theories of dreaming are rather
thin on the ground, and very few approaches are able to
integrate evolutionary psychological and neurobiological
perspectives into their formulations (Whitehouse, 2001,
p. 1). There are refreshing exceptions, of course. Murray
L. Wax (1998, 2004) has thought about dreaming in
both its neurobiological and its sociocultural contexts
and has noted that modern neuroscience removes the
experience of dreaming from the limited context of the
intimate social relations and ethos of the dreamer and
re-frames dreaming as a cognitive process:

P

Current neuropsychological research addresses
behavior and mental processes attributed to the
brain regarded as a wet computer. . . . Research
attention is deflected from the relationships and
responsibilities of social interaction and toward
cognitive process. Yet viewed historically, the facts
are that human beings at all times and places have
required sleep and engaged in dreaming. From an
evolutionary perspective, this is striking. What
functions are thereby being served? (Wax, 2004, p.
86)
This view is useful, for it acknowledges a perspective
that can treat both the sociocultural and evolutionary
neurobiological aspects of dreaming from a single
vantage point. This is the approach my colleagues and I
have used for the past forty years toward such problems
as the relations between cognized and extramental reality
(Laughlin & D’Aquili, 1974; Laughlin, McManus,
& D’Aquili, 1990), ethno-epistemology (Rubinstein,
Laughlin, & McManus, 1984), ritual (d’Aquili,
Laughlin, & McManus, 1979), cultural adaptation
(Laughlin & Brady, 1978) and dreaming (Laughlin,
2011). This approach offers a quite different angle on
the relationship between dreaming and reality. This
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relationship is not merely a philosophical issue, for, as
seen above, most human societies consider dreaming as real.
Naturalist Realism
I approach mind-reality relations from a
standpoint very similar to Clifford Hooker’s (1995)
naturalist realism (pp. 15-18). I do so a bit sheepishly, for
I identify completely with Michael Devitt (1991) when
he wrote, “There is something a little shameful about
spending one’s time defending something so apparently
humdrum as the independent existence of the familiar
world. But the provocations are so great, and my flesh is
too weak” (p. vii). This chagrin is mirrored by philosopher
Moritz Schlick (1991) when he noted: “I must confess
that I should charge with folly and reject a limine every
philosophical system that involved the claim that clouds
and stars, mountains and the sea, were not actually real,
that the ‘physical world’ did not exist, and that the chair
against the wall ceases to be every time I turn my back
on it” (p. 47). Critiquing those philosophers who would
reduce reality to sensations, concepts, or experiences,
Schlick went on to give an excellent definition of reality:
“When [we realists] use the word ‘reality,’ we mean by it
something quite different than you. Your definition of
the real reduces it to experiences; but we mean something
quite independent of all experiences. We mean [by
reality] something that possesses the same independence
that you obviously concede only to the data, in that
you reduce everything else to them, as the not-furtherreducible” (p. 48).
Brains Model Reality
It seems perfectly obvious that there is an
independently existing extramental reality,13 a world
within which Homo sapiens have evolved. It also seems
obvious that human beings have brains in their heads,
and like other animals with brains, their neural systems
develop models of extramental reality and integrate
those models within an experiential reality that informs
knowledge and actions (Laughlin & Loubser, 2010;
Laughlin, McManus, & D’Aquili, 1990; Koch, 2004).
These models are clearly influenced in their development
to varying degrees by inheritance and culture, as well as
the interaction between models and reality (D’Andrade,
1995; Donald, 1991, 2002; Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974;
Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990; Shore, 1996;
Sperber, 2001). Models of extramental reality consist
of neural circuits that operate when individual neural
cells make contact with each other and form a system
or network. Neurons are cells that specialize in reaching
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out, touching (synapsing upon) and influencing the
electrochemical activity of other cells. In this way, neural
circuits constitute neural networks that mediate mental
objects (images, feelings, sensory patterns, phenomenal
relations, etc.) and meaning.
Symbolic Penetration
All objects before the mind operate as symbols,
for they penetrate into the fields of neural circuits
mediating meaning associated with the object—what
is called symbolic penetration (Laughlin, McManus,
& d’Aquili, 1990, pp. 189-195). Sensory objects and
mental images operate like a child’s magnet that, when
placed under a piece of paper upon which iron filings
are sprinkled, magnetically connect with (“penetrate
to”) the iron filings and organize them, and then move
them around as the magnet itself is moved. Turn the
paper over and all one sees is the magnet (the image), yet
below the surface of the paper there is the organization
of iron filings—the field of meaning(s) associated with
the magnet-as-symbol. Neural models are organic, of
course, and operate both to assimilate information about
reality (models determine perceptions and actions), and
to accommodate themselves to the experience of reality
(models are adjusted to information coming from reality
feedback; Piaget, 1977, 1980; see also Block, 1982). This
adjustment process, which may be called the truing of
models, is ongoing from womb to grave, and is one that
is inherited from a long phylogenetic past. Truing of
models involves altering, eliminating, and strengthening
the synaptic circuitry comprising the models (Changeux,
1985; LeDoux, 2003)—removing some iron filings and
adding others. Over the course of development, the
field of meaning that is the model becomes larger, more
complex, more veridical, and more stable as the brain
grows.
The neural modeling function of the brain is an
ancient one. Indeed, the brains of all animals operate in
much the same way, regardless of how primitive they may
be. Neural models must both feed-forward into reality
(anticipate events) and must be capable of plasticity,
growth, and change in order to remain adaptive to a
dynamic environment over time. For example, James
L. Gould (1986; see also Seeley, 2010) has shown that
honeybees operate upon an internal cognitive map of
their landscape, and that the younger the worker bee, the
closer it remains to the hive during the bee’s foraging.
It takes time for its cognized landscape to develop such
that a worker can effectively forage further afield and
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unfailingly find its way home. It would be immediately
advantageous to an animal for a perceptual/pseudoperceptual image to “stand for” and evoke its associated
meaning in memory, and to be the basis of action,
rather than have to seek more information from the
environment before acting. As Seligman and Hager
(1972) pointed out years ago, some images are already
“wired into” the brains of animals so that only one
or a few sensory encounters with the corresponding
bit of reality will suffice to activate inherent meaning
and response schemes, and set them on the course of
development.
Neural models never develop from a random
collection of nerve cells—that is, the brain is at no time
in its ontogenesis a “blank slate” (see Pinker, 1997, 2003,
on this issue). The neonatal brain is not a hodge-podge
of cells all waiting to be assigned a function. Rather, the
brain is organized from its first appearance in gestation,
and just increases its vastly complex organization of neural
networks as the fetus, neonate, infant, and child develop.
Yes, there is plasticity (flexibility, ability to change) in
all neural structures, but plasticity is always limited and
varies in its pliancy depending upon how dedicated is
the function of the model (see LeDoux, 2003, pp. 8-9)
and the neurons that compose it (Ebbesson, 1984).
For instance, networks comprising primary sensory
association areas are less plastic than, say, networks in
the secondary sensory association cortex of the brain
that may get involved in mediating synesthesia or other
higher functions.
Neurognostic Models
Virtually all neural models begin to operate
as soon as they are organized—they are living cells
that organize themselves into organic circuits, not
microchips. Neural models begin as nascent structures
that function in a rudimentary way as models, and those
models that are involved with knowing reality begin
life as what is called neurognosis (or neurognostic models)
—as species-specific, primitive knowledge about the
world and self that is “already there” in a very human
way before enculturation begins (Carey, 2009, p. 67;
Gazzaniga, 2000; Pinker, 1997). As neuroscientist Dale
Purves (2010) noted:
the circuitry of nervous systems such as ours has
evolved to contend with one fundamental challenge:
How to generate useful perceptions and behaviors
in response to a world that is unknowable directly
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by means of sensory stimuli. The strategy that has
emerged to deal with this problem is governed by
history, not logical principles or algorithms. Based
on feedback from the empirical consequences
of behavior, accumulated information about
operational success is realized over evolutionary time
in inherited neural circuitry whose organization
is then modified to a limited extent by individual
experience. (p. 233)
This neural circuitry forms models that have
been passed down through our human DNA and are
configured during neurogenesis under the direction of
genetic inheritance.14 Neurognostic models mediate the
nascent cognitive-perceptual stance to experience, and
from that stance begins active exploration of self and
world—modifying, growing, and developing models in
response to feedback from the world (Miller, Galanter,
& Pribram, 1960). Neurognostic models are virtually
synonymous with what C. G. Jung referred to as
“archetypes” (Stevens, 1982).
Depending upon the physical and cultural
environment, some neurognostic models will develop
and others remain relatively undeveloped, and some
may even die (Changeux, 1985; LeDoux, 2003, pp. 8082; Katz & Shatz, 1996). Some models mediate thought
while others mediate images, feelings, percepts, et cetera,
and their respective development is highly influenced by
culture. In a neurobiological sense, the anthropological
term “enculturation” refers to the social influence
upon neurocognitive development. For instance, a
baby is born perceiving faces because there are areas
of the cortex that are neurognostically structured to
process faces. Enculturation molds the development of
these models so that recognition of specific faces and
meanings associated with various faces, and perhaps
masks, become literally “in-formed” (Varela, 1979)—
associated by way of neural growth and new synaptic
connections with other cells mediating memory.
Reality as Obduracy and Affordancy
Human beings have evolved from a long line of
social primates. All animals with brains operate upon
their own inner cognized world—a world of experience
mediated by their system of neural models (Laughlin &
d’Aquili, 1974; see also Donald, 1991). Social animals are
equipped with brains that are “wired” to know reality in
a communal way (Dunbar, Gamble, & Gowlett, 2010).
How then do humans know when an experience is
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real—and know reality in a socially communal way? The
answer is, the brains of all animals are neurognostically
“pre-wired” to accept the limits of extramental reality
while they are awake—limits that exhibit the twin
qualities of obduracy and affordancy. The term obduracy
generally means the characteristic of reality to resist the
will and intentions of the psyche. If one attempts to push
a finger through a marble table top, one will come up
against the obdurate nature of reality. While one may
dream or fantasize that one is flying without mechanical
help, attempts to do so while awake will prove disastrous.
Much of early development in the baby has to do with
exploring the somatosensory limits of obduracy—the
obduracy of the baby’s environment and of her or his
own body (Piaget, 1980).
The other quality of extramental reality is
affordancy, a term coined by the great perceptual
psychologist James J. Gibson (1979, 1982), for the
interaction between experience and what is allowed by
extramental reality. “Roughly, the affordances of things
are what they furnish, for good or ill, that is, what they
afford the observer” (Gibson, 1982, p. 401). Again, “the
affordances of the environment are what it offers the
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill”
(Gibson, 1979, p. 127). The development of knowledge
about the world is in part a process of discovering and
memorizing what things in reality afford the animal.
What the brain comes to know are the particular
qualities that further the animal’s ability to utilize its
environment. Obviously then, what the world affords
an animal depends upon the nature and structure of the
animal. A stick lying over a stream may afford adequate
support for a squirrel or an ant wishing to cross over,
but not for a large dog. Flowers afford electromagnetic
information in the ultraviolet range for honeybees, but
not for people. Just consider the enormous variety of
objects in the world that people call “chairs” because
they afford sit-ability. If the object is not sit-able, then a
person is not likely to perceive it as a “chair.”
Obduracy and affordancy are actually obverse
qualities of extramental reality in relation to the structure
and limitations of the animal’s body and its nervous
system. Both the body and the world present obdurations
and affordances that condition our intentionality,
and thus operate to limit, guide and inform learning
about one’s body and the world. One encounters these
qualities daily, as do all animals with neurocognitive
systems. One only become aware of them when running
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up against either their resistance to one’s intentions or
new opportunities. Once one has adapted to (trued the
models of) obdurate and affording aspects of the world,
one generally loses awareness of the distinction between
one’s experience of reality and extramental reality itself.
This is an extremely important factor, for most people
consider the world as experienced as real—in other words,
most people do not make a practical distinction between
ontology and epistemology the way many philosophers
and metaphysicians do.
Dreaming and the Transcendental Self
Being asleep in part means that the perceptualbehavioral circuits that operate in waking states shuts
down during dreaming—that is of course what makes
dreaming so “paradoxical.” But this does not mean that
consciousness is freed from the press of reality. Far from
it, for what the dreamer encounters are the obduracy and
affordancy generated by her or his own transcendental
self—that is, the internal neurobiological structures
mediating the sleeping life-world of the brain, including
the available, species-specific functions of the nervous
system, its inherent creativity, and its imaging capabilities
(e.g., honeybees may dream in ultraviolet and electric eels
may dream of non-visual electromagnetic fields, whereas
humans can do neither). While dreaming one experiences
one’s own self-obduracy. Dreams for instance never lie. In
all of the dreaming experiences and research I have done
over a half century, I have never encountered a deceptive
dream. I have of course encountered “trickster” elements
that have operated to fuzzify, obfuscate, or even hide
relations and distinctions. “Shape-shifting” elements
may arise that appear to be one thing and then become
another (e.g., the goddess who transforms before the
dreamer into a demon). In addition, my interpretations of
dream material may be downright wrong as later dream
work may point up. And I have dreamed that “I” (my
dream ego) attempted to dissemble, or to deceive others,
but in all of these situations the dream itself unfailingly
tells the truth about what is happening in my greater self
at the moment.
In Douglas Hollan’s (2003, 2004) term, dreams
are selfscapes—they are imagined depictions of what is
happening in the self at the time of the dream. Also,
baring extreme lucidity, one exercises very little if any
control over dreaming—things just happen to one as a
watcher or participant. One has little or no control over
the course of dreamed events. Yet most people feel more
or less in control of their waking lives, when much of what
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is experienced is due directly to intentions and actions.
Those who have experimented with lucid dreaming know
that one can learn to have considerably more control over
dream adventures and can form waking intentions to
have certain experiences arise while dreaming (LaBerge,
1980)—and can even communicate in a crude fashion
with researchers from within the dream state (LaBerge,
Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone, 1981). There is considerable
evidence that this kind of control is exercised by shamans
and healers when they use dreams to enter other domains
of reality (Winkelman, 2010). However, it is fair to say
that most people do not seek and do not experience this
level of dream control.
In addition, the images that arise in dreams
tend to perfect themselves. Any blemishes, distortions,
cracks, splotches, et cetera, that might be present in
waking perception tend to disappear in dreams, be those
archetypal images or “day residue” images. The image
taken by spirits tend to be perfect in every way. If they
are gods, goddesses, angels and the like, they may be
perfectly beautiful. If on the other hand they are demons,
nixies, monsters, et cetera, they tend to be perfectly
horrible and terrifying. They are, in other words, the
quintessence of whatever is being projected out of the
unconscious, without the moderating and leavening
effect of external perception.
Transcendental Obduracy
and Affordancy in Dreams
Dreams afford revelation of the hidden, the
invisible—the imagined causal connections between
things that are normally unavailable to waking perception.
Like the wind and ocean currents, causation may remain
invisible to waking perception, but may become sensible
in dreams because one can imagine them without
bumping up against external sensory obduracy. Thus,
in a sense, dreams afford us with cosmic confabulation,
filling in the gaps in memories of waking experience.
As one consequence, dreaming facilitates construction
and rehearsal of alternative solutions to problems
without immediate censure from outer extramental
reality (Donald 1995; Nielsen, 2011; Revonsuo, 2000,
2006). Another consequence is that a broader range of
information may be presented to dreaming consciousness
pertaining to the transcendental self, material that might
otherwise interfere with adaptation to the external world
while awake. This is why Jung considered dream work
so fundamental to advanced individuation. Everybody
individuates, but those who take a conscious role in
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their own individuation become far more complex
personalities.
Special dreams (culture pattern dreams) are
commonly archetypal in content. Given freedom from
external contingencies, the neurognostic structures of
the brain are freed up to generate intuitions and images
that represent the dynamic relations deep in the psyche
of the dreamer (Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012). It is entirely
possible that, because of cellular interactions with the
quantum universe, archetypal dream imagery may be
produced by events outside the brain of the dreamer,
as in co-dreaming, prescient dreaming, and so forth
(Laughlin & Throop, 2001).
Conclusion
ost societies on the planet consider dream
experiences as being as real as waking
experiences. Phenomenological evidence suggests a
range of universal attributes of dream experiences upon
which the reality of dreaming relies. The human brain
is designed to operate by seeking and modeling patterns
in experience, and to project those patterns upon the
transcendental nature of reality, regardless of the ASC
in which the experience arises. The ability of the psyche
to generate intuitive and imaginal knowledge about
causation, as well as anticipation of future events,
and explanations of past events, operates to alleviate
the uncertainty and anxiety people fear when causal
relations are complex and hidden from everyday waking
consciousness. Small wonder then that most traditional
and non-technocratic peoples embrace their dream lives
as a font of information of great relevance to the waking
world. Not the least reason for this is the revelation for
the dreamer of her or his own internal psychodynamics
in an ASC which suspends the immediacy of external
adaptations.
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Notes
1.     Over the last several decades the anthropology of
dreaming has taken firm hold and has to some
extent systematized the wealth of ethnographic data
on dreaming cross-culturally (Kennedy & Langness,
1981; Laughlin, 2011; Lohmann, 2003; O’Nell,
1976; Shulman & Stroumsa, 1999; Tedlock, 1992a).
2. See Blainey (2010) on “entheophilic” and
“entheophobic” world views; see also Walsh (2007;
Ch. 24).
3.     “People in the medieval and early modern period
often saw dreams as communications from God—
or from the Devil. For the ancients, dreams were
perhaps more like visitations. Dreams might predict
the future or carry messages” (Pick & Roper, 2004,
p. 3); see also Parman (1991; Ch. 2-3) and Kruger
(2005).
4.        
For instance, see Herr (1981, p. 334) on fuzzy
boundaries among Fijians between what Westerners
call dream, hallucination, and vision; see also
Merrill (1992) on this issue among the Ramámiru
of Mexico.

5.    This is, of course, Jamesian radical empiricism at
work (Jackson, 1989).
6.       Common to all experience is what Antonio Damasio
(1999) has called core consciousness that “provides the
organism with a sense of self about one moment—
now—and about one place—here” (p. 16).
7.      In a few cases, such as among Buddhist and some
other ethno-psychologies, both states are considered
equally illusory.
8.      From the Greek for “capable of being demonstrated”
or “absolutely certain”; see Laughlin (1994a).
9.   See Horton (1982) and Peek (1991) on the African
drive to know the future by dreaming and other
forms of divination.
10. Post hoc reasoning, short for the phrase post hoc ergo
propter hoc (“after this, therefore because of this”) is
the fallacy of reasoning back from the conclusion
to causation in the premise. The fallacy is that just
because B follows A does not mean that A causes B.
11.    Morris, 1982; Radin, 1997a, 1997b, 2006; Puthoff,
Targ, & May, 1981; Jahn, 1981; Bierman & Radin,
1997, 1999; Ebon, 1966.
12. Radin, 1997a, 2006; Jahn & Dunne, 1987; Rao,
2001; Laughlin & Throop, 2008.
13. The world as it exists, independent of any brains
sensing, experiencing, or knowing it.
14. Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974, Ch. 5; Laughlin,
McManus & d’Aquili, 1990, p. 43; Laughlin &
Loubser, 2010; Pinker, 1997; LeDoux, 2003, p. 84;
Ebbesson, 1984; Carey, 2009, Ch. 3.
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